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The historical research conducted for this paper found
operational and economic advantages, ranging from slight to
significant, in favor of multi-crewed vessels when compared
to similar single-crewed vessels. In spite of these find-
ings, nearly all USCG multi-crewing efforts have ultimately
been abandoned. A survey of upper echelon officers in a
position to most directly impact on the administration of
multi-crewed vessels was conducted, and it was determined
that most respondents had erroneous, negative perceptions
about the levels of efficiency, productivity, maintenance,
and morale that could be expected aboard such units. Inter-
views with crewmembers from dual-crewed vessels revealed an
organizational approach to implementation of the concept
that was vague and inconsistent. The research concludes by
declaring that r.ulti-crewed organizations have not yet had
the opportunity to display their full performance potential
due to organizational, leadership, and communications short-
comings. Organization Development oriented recommendations
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States military maritime services have tradi-
tionally manned their ships with one permanently assigned
crew per vessel. Military aircraft, and small floating
units (less than 65' in length) are routinely operated by
any of a number of crews on any given day. The advantages
of multi crewing are both basic and obvious. Once necessary
maintenance and repairs have been performed, after a plat-
form has completed a deployment or sortie, that resource is
available for another mission if the people that man it are
ready. In the case of some single-crewed ships, the dura-
tion of a typical mission is such that the one crew needs
more time inport, before another extended absence is possi-
ble, than the amount of time needed for scheduled and after-
action maintenance. During this time of necessary crew
rest, the platform remains idle at the pier. The amount of
additional time underway that could be acquired is a func-
tion of how much maintenance each vessel type demands. Cer-
tainly there are classes of single-crewed military ships in
service today from which we are currently enjoying the
maximum utility because of unavoidable maintenance con-
straints. It is equally as certain that there are also ves-
sel types within our military fleet capable of providing
additional utility by way of multi crewing.
Why, then, are some of our ships not multi crewed? We
have, in the past, made temporary attempts with limited suc-
cess. A brief history and description of these endeavors is
offered in the next chapter. The operational feasibility of
past efforts is well documented but, in the long run, fre-
quently the concept is abandoned.
It is my hypothesis that the underlying, fundamental
problem that limits the potential success of selective multi
crewing of ships is common to any new approach to how we do
things: resistance to change! This resistance comes in two
forms, both of which, I believe, can be managed. First, the
pride that develops between sailors and their ships results
in a fierce hull loyalty. We have seen that, with proper
leadership, this loyalty can be transferred to a crew,
squadron, or division completely enough to experience no
loss in proficiency or dedication. Second, among many of
the individuals involved in surface operations, there exists
the perception that the concept is neither workable nor
supported. The reasons for this attitude are based upon
inaccurate beliefs about the efficiency, productivity,
maintenance, and morale of multi-crewed units. Contributing
to the resistance created by these erroneous assumptions, is
the apparent and recognized rejection of the concept by many
members of the upper echelon. It is not so much this
failure of management to get behind multi crewing that
weakens it, as it is their tendency to get in front of it.
Support from upper management is not as critical to success
as resistance is to failure.
In order to determine the performance of past multi-
crewed vessels, research of historical data was conducted
and compared to similar single-crewed units. Emphasis was
placed on efficiency, productivity, maintenance, and morale.
Interviews with crewmembers from two dual-crewed 82 • patrol
boats transpired in a further attempt to identify specific
strengths and weaknesses unique to sharing a hull, and asso-
ciated with the concept. Finally, a survey of ninety senior
Coast Guard officers was taken to determine their percep-
tions about this type crewing configuration. Incidental to
the senior officer survey, twenty-eight junior Coast Guard
officers were surveyed at the Naval Postgraduate School to
ensure the instrument was clear and unambiguous.
As was expected, multi-crewed vessels proved to be
equally as productive and efficient as similar single-crewed
units in one instance, and significantly more so in another.
A review of required, annual inspection reports for similar
units operating under each crewing configuration revealed no
significant difference in how well the units were maintain-
ed. Finally, no untenable morale problems unique to multi
crewing surfaced during the research. The majority of
survey responses to questions on these issues were opposite
to what, in fact, occurs. Particularly noteworthy was the
widespread and accurate perception of most officers surveyed
that officers senior to them were opposed to the concept of
multi-crewing ships. Frequently, this opposition was based
on beliefs opposite that which historical research
establishes.
The study that follows is presented in a manner that,
hopefully, allows the reader to develop an understanding of
how the concept of multi-crewing ships has evolved, and come
to be viewed as it is today. First, a selective history of
the concept, as recently applied by the United States Coast
Guard, is offered to provide the reader with a knowledge of
past multi-crewing efforts. Next, the methodology used to
gather and analyze the data collected is covered, including
a description of survey sample size and demographics. This
information is followed by the presentation and interpreta-
tion of the data collected. The implementation problems
associated with the concept of multi-crewing ships, that
surfaced as a result of data gathering and interpretation,
are then examined. Management and leadership alternatives
that have promise of alleviating past shortcomings are then
discussed. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are
developed, including a brief, general description of how a
viable squadron of several multi-crewed patrol boats might
be organized.
Expanding Coast Guard missions call for expanded Coast
Guard presence, and additional crews are far less expensive
than additional ships and crews. Further, the flexibility
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that multi crewing offers in terms of personnel absences for
away-from-ship training or leave (vacation) is significant.
Budgetary constraints may soon necessitate compromises in
how we operate our vessels so as to gain additional utility
and efficiency from the limited resources we currently
employ. Today, these constraints preclude continued multi-
crewing efforts but, imminently, the inherent practical and
economic gains of multi crewing will dictate further
attempts at it. I am convinced that resistance to change is
the largest barrier to the permanent acceptance and estab-
lishment of multi-crewed ships. It is my hope that this
thesis will serve as a source of historical data and
research to be consulted when next we attempt to organize a
squadron or division of multi-crewed vessels.
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II. HISTORY
The U.S. Coast Guard has conducted numerous experiments,
and commissioned many floating units, with multi-crewing
organizations, particularly in the past ten years. A brief
description of these efforts is useful for developing an
appreciation of how the USCG approach to the concept has
evolved.
A. THE WPB AUGMENTATION DETAIL
During the spring of 1980 a special operation was con-
ducted in the Florida Straights that involved temporarily
dual-crewing patrol boats that were normally single crewed.
Approximately six 82' patrol boats homeported along the east
coast of the United States were brought to Miami, Florida by
their permanently assigned crews. The boats generally
arrived in pairs, and each pair was involved in the opera-
tion for approximately three weeks. Two complete additional
crews were formed by identifying qualified individuals
throughout the Coast Guard, and bringing them to Miami for
the duration of the eight week operation. Each of the two
additional crews were assigned to each of the paired patrol
boats. The intent of the operation was to temporarily
generate a more frequent Coast Guard presence in and around
the Florida Straights by increasing the utility of the
vessels. Assigned crews would alternate manning the boats
12
for three day rotations. Once both the permanently assigned
crew and the temporarily assigned crew had each completed
two patrols, or every 12 to 15 days, the vessel would remain
inport for five days maintenance. The project accomplished
its purpose of increased Coast Guard vessel visibility in
the vicinity of historically active drug delivery routes.
More important to this thesis, while the brevity of the
exercise left little time for generally espoused concerns
regarding multi crewing to surface, as the Commanding Offi-
cer of one of the two relief crews, I recall that most of
the participants in the operation very rapidly adjusted to
the necessary sharing of units.
B. POLAR CLASS ICEBREAKERS
Our Coast Guard has, among other missions, the task of
keeping waterways necessary for commerce free enough of ice
to be navigable. The largest vessel within the U.S. Coast
Guard fleet is the Polar Class Icebreaker, of which we have
two. The development of these 399' ships took place in the
mid-seventies. Normal ship's complement is 136 men and
women, and a typical deployment is from two to five months,
depending on where the vessel is bound for. Originally, the
two ships were to be manned by three rotating crews.
However, according to a representative of the Coast Guard's
Office of Ice Operations (G-OIO) located at USCG Headquar-
ters in Washington, D.C., personnel constraints precluded
ever actually applying the concept. Moreover, as these
13
ships came on line, there were increasing concerns that they
were more maintenance-intensive than originally expected.
The advanced technologies and arduous environmental condi-
tions under which these powerful icebreakers operate demand
considerably more attention to maintenance than the time
available for it in a multi-crewed configuration.
C. RIVER BUOY TENDERS
The late seventies brought a variation of multi crewing
to a small segment of the Coast Guard's buoy tender fleet.
The intercoastal waterways of the United States are
comprised of rivers with navigable routes identified by
buoys and markers. These particular aids to navigation are
maintained by a fleet of small buoy tenders ranging in
length from 65' to 115', with crew sizes varying from 12 to
22 people. According to a representative of the Coast
Guard's Office of Navigation (G-NSR) at USCG Headquarters,
during the late seventies the geographic areas of
responsibility for 24 such Coast Guard cutters was
redistributed among 18 ships, which were then each augmented
with six to eight additional crewmembers. These vessels
generally deployed for two weeks, followed by two weeks
inport. Crew augmentation allowed most crewmembers to
rotate remaining ashore every third patrol. A reduced
number of vessels were maintaining the original number of
aids to navigation by spending more time underway.
Ultimately, the age of several of these buoy tenders
14
precluded continued high paced operations. However, 12 of
the original 18 cutters still operate under this augmented
organization today.
D. THE WPB DIVISION
One of the purest forms of multi crewing aboard ship was
experienced during the period from 1981 through 1985 in
Miami, Florida. Two 95' patrol boats were manned by three
rotating crews. These two boats and three crews, augmented
by an assigned ten person support staff, together foirmed the
WPB Division. Normal crewing requirements for this type
patrol boat consists of 12 to 14 men and women. However,
the assigned shoreside support for inport periods allowed
the cutters to operate with a crew of ten people. The pri-
mary missions of patrol boats are search and rescue, as well
as law enforcement. This unique Patrol Boat Division was
disbanded in early 1986 because, much like several of the
augmented buoy tenders of the late seventies, the age of
this type patrol boat precluded its extended use in such
high-paced operations. The performance of the WPB Division
is the subject of closer examination in Chapter IV.
E. THE SES DIVISION
Another effort at multi-crewing ships took place in Key
West, Florida in 1982. Working in concert with the estab-
lishment of the U.S. Vice Presidential Task Force on Drugs,
the USCG acquired three surface effect ships. These 110'
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vessels represent state of the art technology in terms of
patrol boat speed and stability. The three ships were
manned by four rotating crews, each consisting of 14 to 16
men and women. Together with a shoreside support staff of
approximately 20 additional people, the entire organization
formed the SES Division. During the three years of the
Division's existence, its operational success was demon-
strated by the seizure of over 50 vessels laden with over
250,000 pounds of marijuana having a street value of approx-
imately $100,000,000. Unfortunately, similar to the Polar
Class Icebreakers, these vessels were found to be signifi-
cantly more maintenance-intensive than envisioned and, as a
result, in early 1986 the ships assumed the traditional
single-crewing configuration. Aspects of the performance of
these units are also reviewed in Chapter IV.
F. COSARFACS
A variation on multi crewing that minimizes the poten-
tially adverse effects of several crews rotating through
several vessels, particularly the loss of hull loyalty, is
dual crewing. The WPB Augmentation Detail, previously
described in Section A of this chapter, is an example of
this approach. A more extended effort at this concept was
accomplished along the west coast of the United States
during the decade from 1975 to 1985. Seven 82' patrol
boats, each normally manned by a single crew of eight to
nine men, were dual-crewed. These units were each then
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referred to as a Coastal Search and Rescue Facility
(COSARFAC) . A close examination of the performance of these
organizations is offered in Chapter IV. A representative of
the U.S. Coast Guard's Office of Operations (G-0) identified
developing personnel shortages as the primary catalyst for
the recent shift back to single crewing by these units.
G. INTERNATIONAL—SMALL NATION NAVIES
Many countries throughout the world have a limited need,
or economic ability, to develop a large naval force. Two
examples of this situation are described. The information
offered suggests that many of the problems associated with
the concept of multi-crewing vessels may not exist, or
surface, prior to experience with single crewing.
1. The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces
Sierra Leone is a small country located on the west
coast of Africa, approximately 400 miles north of the
equator. This politically neutral nation received its inde-
pendence from Great Britain in 1961, has a population of
3,000,000 people, and is comparable in size to North
Carolina. Sierra Leone's military has a maritime branch
currently consisting of approximately forty men, and one 65'
patrol boat. The normal manning of this vessel consists of
one officer and eight or nine enlisted men. Therefore, the
three officers of the naval branch alternate operating the
vessel with whichever of the four possible crews is assigned
that duty on any given day. Generally, core crew stability
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is maintained. However, occasionally crew members alternate
from one group to another to facilitate coordination of
necessary, individual absences. During an informal conver-
sation with Lieutenant Mohammad Diaby, operations officer of
the RSLMF Navy, maintenance and morale issues associated
with the multi-crewing concept were discussed. Mr. Diaby
felt that crew rotation offered significant advantages in
terms of flexibility. He indicated he had experienced no
perceivable adverse impact on unit effectiveness that
resulted from lack of hull loyalty or ownership. When asked
if the service would adopt single crewing at its first
opportunity, LT Diaby expressed doubt. Noting that his navy
had never permanently assigned any single crew to a vessel,
he knew of no reason to do so.
2 . The Grenada Coast Guard
Grenada, one of the island nations in the Caribbean
Sea, has a situation similar to that of Sierra Leone.
Having achieved its independence from Great Britain in 1974,
this ex-colony espouses a foreign policy of non-alignment.
Grenada has a land area of 133 square miles, and a popula-
tion of approximately 100,000 people. Their Coast Guard is
currently operating a 109* patrol vessel and two 30' boats
by rotating their 2 5 member force through the various hulls.
During recent onsite observations of this operation, and
after discussions with Grenada Coast Guard members, no
significant barriers or hindrances to unit effectiveness
18
were identified that could be attributed to their multi-
crewing approach.
Thus it would seem a person's position on multi
crewing depends largely on their experience with single
crewing. Further, if their belief is that a multi-crewed
vessel will not perform as well as a single-crewed vessel
because they predict maintenance and morale will suffer for
lack of vessel ownership, then this resistance to the
concept is based on erroneous perceptions rather than a
rational, objective evaluation.
H. USN FBM SUBMARINES
The Unites States Navy has dual-crewed fleet ballistic
missile submarines from the time of their conception,
beginning in the early 1970s. This researcher communicated
by letter and telephone on several occasions with Submarine
Group Nine, located at the Bangor Naval Submarine Base in
Bremerton, Washington. It was my intent to visit this
facility and examine more closely their approach to imple-
menting the concept of multi-crewing submarines, as well as
interview several crewmembers to determine their reaction to
sharing a hull. Unfortunately, I was unable to gain access
to these resources. One reason offered by a representative
of the organization was that any such visit might interfere
with ongoing preparations to meet future operational commit-
ments. It is felt that these units are a rich source of
data and experience concerning multi-crewed vessels. The
19
history and performance of USN FBM submarines regarding
multi crewing is suggested as an area for further research.
20
III. METHODOLOGY
Establishing the existence of resistance to the concept
and implementation of multi-crewing vessels involved a
simple two step approach. First, a review of previous
multi-crewed USCG cutter organizational efforts served to
provide cost and productivity data for comparison with
similar single-crewed vessels. The fact that one or more of
these multi-crewed organizations proved to be more cost
effective than a similar single-crewed unit, but that the
multi-crewed organizations were ultimately disbanded, sug-
gests that there is lack of support for the concept. The
second step, after determining the existence of resistance
to the concept, was to identify the origins of this apparent
rejection.
The hypothesis for the thesis assumes that erroneous
perceptions exist, on the part of mid and upper level deci-
sion makers, about the efficiency, productivity, maintenance
and morale of multi-crewed vessels, and that these negative
attitudes are influenced by those of their seniors. Verifi-
cation of these assumptions was accomplished by identifying
and surveying those upper echelon operations and staff ele-
ments that would have the most impact on multi-crewed vessel
administration. The targeted population of mid and upper
level managers whose perceptions were sought included each
21
Commanding Officer, or his representative, of all USCG 378'
high endurance cutters, as well as 270* and 210' medium
endurance cutters. Appendix A, which was developed by LCDR
M.J. Pierce USCG and LCDR R.L. Porter USCG [Ref. l:p. 37],
depicts the U.S. Coast Guard Organization in terms of geo-
graphic areas of responsibility. Office chiefs, or their
representatives, at the Headguarters level that were
surveyed included the Offices of: Operations (G-0) , Law
Enforcement (G-OLE) , Search and Rescue (G-OSR) , Personnel
(G-P) , Enlisted Personnel (G-PE) , Officer Personnel (G-PO)
,
Engineering (G-E) , and Naval Engineering (G-ENE) . Office
chiefs, or their representatives, at the Area level that
were surveyed included the Offices of: Operations (AO/PO)
and Operations Center (AOC/POC) . Office chiefs, or their
representatives, at the District level that were surveyed
included the Offices of: Operations (o) , Search and Rescue
(osr) , Intelligence and Law Enforcement (oil) , Safety (dso)
Inspection (di) , and Operations Readiness (or)
.
A total of 100 surveys were distributed, of which 75
were returned with useful responses. The level of interest
and participation was encouraging and appreciated.
22
IV. WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?
In order to compare levels of productivity, efficiency,
maintenance, and morale between single-crewed and multi-
crewed vessels, a three pronged approach to data gathering
was taken. First, historical data covering the performance
of three different crewing configurations was reviewed.
Next, interviews with crewmembers from dual-crewed vessels
were conducted. Finally a survey of senior Coast Guard
officers currently assigned to staff positions that impact
on floating unit administration was taken. The purpose of
the survey was to determine perceptions about the issues
covered in the historical research, and to take a measure of
how the respondents believed officers senior to them felt
about the multi-crewing of vessels.
A. HISTORICAL RESEARCH
1. 82' WPBs
A comparative analysis was conducted between single-
crewed 82' WPBs and dual-crewed 82' WPBs (COSARFACs) . The
annual operating costs and actual hours underway over a two
year period for thirteen units, six conventionally crewed
82' WPBs and the seven COSARFACs, was obtained. All thir-
teen vessels studied were stationed along the California
coast between Eureka to the north and San Diego to the
south. Data from fiscal years 1984 and 1985 was used
23
because that information was recent enough to be topical in
terms of mission demands. A two year time frame was decided
upon to ensure all significant operating cost items and
events that limited vessel availability, for example bienni-
al yard periods, were taken into account. Operating costs
were obtained from the annual summary of Operatincf Costs of
Coast Guard Cutters provided by the Office of the Comptrol-
ler, Accounting Division (G-FAC-6) , Coast Guard Headquar-
ters, Washington, D.C. These costs included military pay
and allowances, operating maintenance costs and fuel, elec-
tronics program updates, vessel program updates, and miscel-
laneous costs. The number of hours underway for each unit
was acquired from the annual summary of Operational Statis-
tics provided by the Office of Operations, Plans and
Programs Staff (G-OP) . Table I of Appendix B reflects that
the average number of hours underway annually during fiscal
years 1984 and 1985 for the six single-crewed 82 ' WPBs
studied was 1,017 at an average annual cost of $331,219.
The resulting cost per hour underway for this type unit was
$325.68. The seven dual-crewed platforms proved signifi-
cantly more productive and efficient, with an average number
of hours underway annually during FYs 84 and 85 of 2,182.3
at an average annual cost of $302,888. The resulting cost
per hour underway for this type unit was $138.79. The fact
that the average annual operating costs for a patrol boat
with a smaller crew and less than half as many average
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annual resource hours was higher than for the dual-crewing
configuration necessitated a closer examination of the
breakdown of costs. The average annual maintenance costs
for the single-crewed boats was 44% higher than for the
dual-crewed boats, and vessel program update costs were 84%
higher. Generally, vessel program updates are scheduled
independent of annual cutter operations, and not a function
of crewing configuration. However, even after eliminating
the approximate $25,000 additional cost per single-crewed
hull for this expense, the dual-crewed vessels cost slightly
less to operate per year and are more than twice as produc-
tive. Overall, the data suggests that, if the productivity
and efficiency differences between the two crewing
configurations that occurred along the California coast
applied nationwide, had all 52 of the 82' WPBs in service in
FYs 84 and 85 been dual crewed, then the total resource
hours for this type unit would have more than doubled
(increased by nearly 115%) for approximately $300,000 less
than the total two year cost that was actually incurred. '
The survey results, which will be reviewed in detail
in Section B of this chapter, indicated increased
maintenance is an area of primary concern that would serve
to hamper and negate the positive impact of the additional
^Actual Annual Costs: Potential Annual Costs:
7 COSARFACs $2,120,169 52 COSARFACs 15,750,197
45 s/c 82' 13.779.855 ($331,219 - $25,000 X 45)
$15,900,871
Difference = $148,874 x 2 years = $299,748
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hours underway experienced by rotating crews. However, a
review of the operational statistics for FYs 84 and 85 for
the thirteen 82 ' WPBs studied does not substantiate this
phenomenon. Specifically, as reflected in Figure 1, the six
single-crewed units required an average of 2,643.8 hours of
maintenance per unit in order to accomplish their average of
1,017 hours underway annually, or 2.6 hours of maintenance
for each hour underway. The seven dual-crewed units
required an average of 2,603.6 hours of maintenance to
accomplish their 2,182.3 hours underway, or 1.19 hours of
maintenance for each hour underway. This increased
opportunity for maintenance enjoyed by the single-crewed 82'
WPBs may provide constructive employment for the crew while
inport, but does not appear to be necessary to increase the
utility of the platform.
Dual Crew "^ Single Crew
Single Crew Average = 2644 hrs
Dual Crew Average = 2604 hrs
Patrol Boats
Figure 1. 82' WPB Maintenance Hours—FYs 84/85
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An additional concern expressed during the survey
was that vessel maintenance and appearance would suffer for
lack of the hull loyalty experienced with single-crew unit
ownership. However, a review of the annual District Inspec-
tion results for FY 85 for the thirteen 82 ' WPBs studied
failed to show any significant differences in either overall
maintenance or appearance between the two crewing configura-
tions. In fact, as reflected in Table II of Appendix B, the
dual-crewed units achieved slightly higher average ratings
in every category.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to review the
productivity, efficiency, and maintenance records of the
thirteen units studied over the approximate ten year history
of the COSARFACs. It is the opinion of this researcher that
such a study would support the findings of this paper. Con-
cern expressed in the survey over long run unit deteriora-
tion aboard multi-crewed units due to poor maintenance, for
lack of ownership, appears unfounded. Even if there is some
merit to this concern, the level and pace of that deteriora-
tion would not seem to outweigh the significant increases in
efficiency and productivity enjoyed by multi crewing.
2. 95' WPBs
A comparative analysis was conducted between the WPB
Division and similar single crewed units in the same
geographic area. The WPB Division, which was homeported in
Miami, Florida, consisted of two 95' WPBs manned by three
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rotating crews. Two single-crewed 95' WPBs homeported in
Key West, Florida were identified as units with geographic
areas of responsibility and mission requirements similar
enough to make a comparison reasonable. Data from two
years, FYs 84 and 85, was collected and analyzed. Table I
of Appendix B reflects that the average number of hours
underway annually during FYs 84 and 85 for the two single-
crewed 95' WPBs was 2,372, at an average annual cost of
$395,585. The resulting cost per hour underway for this
type unit was $166.77. The average number of hours underway
annually for the two multi-crewed 95' WPBs was 2,282, at an
average annual cost of $448,823. The resulting cost per
hour underway for this type unit was $196.68, or
approximately $3 more per hour for the multi-crewed
vessels. It should be noted that the number of resource
hours accumulated during FY 85 for one of the multi-crewed
95' WPBs studied, the Cape Gull, was significantly reduced
by extended maintenance. However, even if the Cape Gull had
achieved a more typical underway profile during FY 85, the
cost per hour comparison between single-crewed and multi-
crewed 95' WPBs in the southeastern United States suggests
that this type patrol boat is not significantly more
efficient or productive when multi crewed.
Slight vessel appearance and maintenance differences
for the two crewing configurations were noted in the FY 85
District Inspection results reviewed. Specifically, as
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reflected in Table II of Appendix B, the material inspection
and naval engineering scores for one of the three crews that
comprised the WPB Division were rated 'good. ' This is an
acceptable level of performance, but below average relative
to all other units studied. According to the senior member
of the inspection party, an 06, the two remaining crews in
the Division achieved 'excellent' scores in these categories
because "a well motivated crew can achieve with guidance and
encouragement (leadership)." The subpar performance of the
one crew is, therefore, attributed to less than adequate
guidance and encouragement, vice loss of hull loyalty due to
lack of ownership. Chapter V will examine the impact of
leadership in detail.
The specific explanation for the better economies
enjoyed by dual-crewed 82' WPBs, but not experienced by
multi-crewed 95' WPBs, was examined. Two significant
differences between the platforms are vessel age and owner-
ship. The 95' WPBs are approximately eleven years older
than the 82' WPBs and, therefore, may possibly not be able
to accomplish more than 2500 hours underway per year regard-
less of how they are crewed. Their larger crew complement,
as compared to an 82' WPB, allows the single-crewed 95' WPB
to obtain as many hours underway annually as a multi-crewed
95' WPB might in the same geographic area and with the same
mission. The second major difference between the dual-
crewed 82' WPB and the multi-crewed 95' WPB is crew
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affiliation with a particular hull. The dual crews of the
82' WPBs did not alternate among platforms, as did the three
crews of the 95' WPB Division. The issue of ownership/hull
loyalty, and its effect on appearance and maintenance, was
examined by comparing annual inspection results.
Significant differences between single-crewed and multi-
crewed units were not observed.
3 . The SES Division
A study of the SES Division, homeported in Key West,
Florida, was made in an attempt to further determine the
impact on maintenance and appearance of crews rotating among
hulls, as well as to further establish vessel age as a pri-
mary factor explaining productivity differences between
multi-crewed 82' and 95' WPBs. The Surface Effect Ship
Division was comprised of three 110' vessels with primary
missions and standard crewing requirements similar to that
of a 95' WPB. Much like the WPB Division, the WSESs were
manned by rotating four crews through the three hulls to
increase platform productivity. The average number of hours
underway annually for each of the three WSESs during fiscal
years 1984 and 1985 was 2,311. This figure is deceptively
low as all three vessels underwent extended maintenance
periods to accomplish extensive changes to their physical
layout during the period. The SES Division averaged 232
annual maintenance days per unit during FYs 84 and 85,
including approximately 70 maintenance days each for vessel
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retrofit. The WPB Division averaged 159 annual maintenance
days per unit during the same period. This means that the
multi-crewed WSESs were approximately 30% more productive,
as measured by actual hours spent underway when available,
than the multi-crewed 95' WPBs. The analysis tends to
verify that maintenance demands, as dictated by vessel age
for the 95' WPB, or technology for the WSES, appears to be
the limiting factor in how much utility can be expected from
these two vessel types. Once again, a review of the FY 83
annual inspection report for the WSESs did not reveal any
substandard appearance or maintenance. Specifically, the
SES Division received an overall evaluation of 'outstand-
ing, ' the material condition of the cutters was determined
to be 'outstanding,' the naval engineering function was
rated 'excellent,' and an 'outstanding' score was achieved
on the personnel inspection. I was unable to substantiate
the development of apathy or procrastination, leading to
poor vessel maintenance or appearance because of loss of
hull loyalty, stemming from the absence of one crew to one
vessel ownership. Concern over this issue is frequently,
and understandably, expressed during inquiry, but the
phenomenon is not apparent in reality.
B. THE SURVEY
Logically, critical measures of unit performance involve
productivity, maintenance, morale, and efficiency. The sur-
vey included questions to determine each respondent's
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perceptions of how multi-crewed vessels compared to single-
crewed vessels on each of these measures. An additional
area of research interest concerned to what extent the
respondent's support of, or opposition to multi crewing was
influenced by their perceptions of how officers senior to
them felt about it. Finally, each respondent was asked to
indicate their own feelings about the concept.
Appendix C is a copy of the survey instrument. Based on
the responses provided, a statistical analysis of the data
was conducted by treating questions 8, 9, 10, 11, and 17 as
predictors, or independent variables. These questions
covered respondent perceptions of the comparison between the
two crewing configurations on the critical measures of unit
performance described, and perceived upper echelon support
or opposition to the concept of multi-crewing vessels.
Question 13, which asked the respondents' own position on
the issue, was then used as the criterion, or dependent
variable. Responses of A or B to predictor questions 8, 9,
10, and 11 were assigned a value of 1, meaning supportive,
and a C response was assigned a value of 2, indicating
opposition. A response of A, B, or C to questions 13 and 17
translated to a value of 1, while a D or E response rated a
2. Table III of Appendix B presents the data in the des-
cribed format. An accurate prediction of how each respon-
dent feels about multi-crewing vessels can be made 78% of
the time by simply observing which of the values, 1 or 2 , is
32
more prevalent among the five predictors. This is signifi-
cant because the best that could be expected randomly is
50%.
Correlations between each independent (predictor)
variable and the dependent (criterion) variable, as well as
among the independent variables, are presented in Figure 2.
Subject Productivity Maintenance Morale Efficiency Seniors Opinion
PredOe Pred 09 Pred 010 Pred Oil Pred 017 CritQI3
Productmly 1 000 0324 0310 0.415 0214 0260
Maintenance 324 1.000 502 0407 447 489
Morale 0.310 502 1.000 0.185 306 640
Efficiency 0.415 0407 185 1 000 118 0.328
Seniors 0214 0447 0.306 0.118 1 000 0.255
Opinion 0.260 489 0.640 0328 255 1 000
Figure 2. Correlation Matrix for Predictor and
Criterion Variables
Correlations between .3 and .7 are considered moderately
strong enough to infer the possibility of causal relation-
ships. The data displayed in Figure 2 serves to rank-order
how much respondent perceptions about each measure of unit
performance, and perceived upper echelon support or opposi-
tion to multi-crewing vessels, impacts on their opinion of
the concept. As can be seen, respondent perceptions of how
morale and maintenance aboard multi-crewed vessels compares
with that aboard single-crewed vessels correlates highest
with their declared position, supportive or opposed, on the
issue of multi crewing. It is also interesting to note that
the correlation between these two variables, .502, is the
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highest among the predictors. This suggests that mainte-
nance is affected by morale, which seems quite reasonable.
The historical research previously discussed indicates the
level of maintenance aboard multi-crewed vessels is equal,
if not superior, to that found aboard similar single-crewed
units. Perceptions about efficiency are also above the .3
correlation hurdle for affecting opinion. Feelings
expressed by respondents regarding productivity comparisons
between the two crewing configurations, and the impact of
perceived senior officer viewpoint, are less significant,
but do approach correlation levels indicative of a possible
causal relationship between these predictors and the criter-
ion question of opinion.
A stepwise linear regression of the data was also run,
using the standard levels of acceptable entry and exit for
each independent variable into the proposed model, to arrive
at a formula that would explain as much of the variance
among the predictors and criterion as possible. This
approach identified morale and efficiency as the two inde-
pendent variables that, when combined, best predict opinion.
This information is displayed in Table IV of Appendix B.
Perhaps the most interesting outcome revealed by the
statistical analysis is that, of the 78% of those surveyed
about which a correct prediction can be made regarding their
support of, or opposition to, multi-crewing vessels, 56% of
those in opposition to the concept reach their conclusion
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armed with erroneous assumptions about two or more of the
five predictor variables. Certainly, it is reasonable to
assume that multi-crewed vessels have enjoyed reduced sup-
port as a result of this phenomenon, and to expect that
these organizations have not yet been able to fully demon-
strate their potential utility and effectiveness.
C. THE INTERVIEWS
In an effort to further identify the strengths and weak-
nesses associated with the concept of multi-crewing vessels,
and to determine to what extent these characteristics can be
manipulated so as to maximize the advantages and minimize
the problems inherent with the concept, individual inter-
views were conducted with COSARFAC crewmembers. Two dual-
crewed 82' WPBs were visited in Los Angeles, California.
Four crewmembers from each unit participated in the
research. The interviewees included the Commanding Officer,
as well as senior and junior enlisted personnel from both
the engineering and hull maintenance departments. The
variation in time aboard the units ranged from three to
twenty-four months among the eight participants, with the
average being 13.6 months.
There were five questions in particular that covered the
issues of central interest to the thesis. A discussion of




What is going well with your crewing configuration?
What are its strengths, the positive qualities?
All eight respondents identified additional free
time, relative to the long hours demanded of crewmembers
aboard conventionally manned vessels, as the greatest advan-
tage of multi crewing. The additional manpower available
aboard multi-crewed units was also universally mentioned.
There was a consensus among the interviewees that the plat-
form is better maintained and more productive as a result of
having more personnel. Among the more senior participants
in the interviews, the higher experience level of the crew
that existed because of the larger crew size was identified
as an advantage of multi crewing. Finally, one senior
enlisted interviewee pointed out that fatigue, resulting
from extended operations, was reduced because of the relief




What is not going well with your crewing configura-
tion? What are the problems, concerns, and issues?
Consistency and uniformity surfaced as the central
issues in response to this question. Anything less than
full crew reliefs results in inequities that lead to
frustration and dissatisfaction. Poor communications and
incomplete briefings during actual crew rotation results in
inefficient or redundant work distribution. Issues includ-
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ing unclear authority and responsibility were identified.
Also mentioned by two enlisted interviewees was conflict
that surfaces when distinct separation between crews exist,
resulting in levels of training differences, and unhealthy
competition. Many of the survey respondents expressed con-
cern that multi crewing a vessel would negatively impact on
unit esprit de corps. Interviewees acknowledged that there
is a limited amount of conflict between crews regarding work
responsibilities, but indicated that the frequency of such
disagreements was comparable to similar incidents aboard
single-crewed vessels. Moreover, interviewees generally
felt that all unit personnel, together, formed a cohesive
team. As a further check on the need for extended team
building when employing the multi-crewing concept, an
approach developed by W.G. Dyer [Ref. 2:pp. 27-40] was used.
Employing Dyer's checklist, which was designed to measure
the extent of unit problems involving such issues as con-
flict, apathy, and trust, little evidence surfaced to sug-
gest that the multi-crewed units visited were less team
oriented than single-crewed vessels. The success of
developing team spirit aboard multi-crewed vessels appears
similar to that of conventionally crewed units. Unique to
the COSARFACS, but along the lines of equity and
consistency, was the universal concern expressed by
crewmembers of pay and commissary privileges not enjoyed in
their organization that are standard benefits aboard single-
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crewed vessels. This is due to legislation and regulations
that are currently worded in a way that precludes providing
these benefits to vessels that are not manned and operated




What is the purpose of your crewing configuration
(goal, objective)? Is it clear?
None of the interviewees were aware of any official
answer to this question. All responses were qualified as a
guess, and included reducing fatigue and increasing unit
productivity as the purpose of multi crewing. It is inter-
esting to note that, while the purposes cited are chief
among the intended accomplishments of the multi-crewing
concept, no crew member had ever actually been told that.
One junior enlisted respondent was not aware that all 82'
WPBs were not dual crewed until several months after
reporting aboard the unit.
4 Perceived Upper Echelon Attitudes
How do you think people senior to you feel about
this crewing configuration?
The general consensus among those interviewed was
that people senior to themselves in the chain of command
provide the level of support deemed necessary and expected
by the upper echelon. Interviewees, as a group, had no
strong sense of upper echelon favor or opposition to the
concept. However, while the majority of answers to this
38
question were as described, there were several individual
responses, covering all levels of unit hierarchy, expressing
a perception of upper echelon favor with the concept, or a
clear feeling of management opposition to multi-crewing
vessels. Again, no trend that could be correlated with such
variables as paygrade or experience was observed.
5. Job Satisfaction
How do you compare this crewing configuration to
single-crewed platforms in terms of job satisfaction?
A slight majority of those interviewed declared
single crewing as being more satisfying in terms of author-
ity and responsibility. The most frequently mentioned
reasons for this response included many of the factors iden-
tified as weaknesses with the multi-crewing approach to
manning vessels, specifically, lack of consistency, due pri-
marily to failure to clearly identify and assign areas of
responsibility and ownership to specific, designated person-
nel. Respondents generally agreed that the increased man-
power of multi crewing provided significant rewards (addi-
tional free time and productivity) that, if properly
organized and managed, made multi crewing the more desirable
crewing configuration. Individually, each interivewee
declared that they would have no problem with working in a
properly managed, multi-crewed, multi-vessel organization,
however, many interviewees expressed doubt as to whether
others could function under the concept.
39
D . SUMMARY
The historical research conducted establishes that the
82 ' WPB performs significantly better in terms of productiv-
ity and efficiency when multi crewed. The 95' WPB and the
110' WSES do not exhibit higher levels of performance on
these measures when multi crewed, due to the maintenance
demands of vessel age and technology, respectively. There
is no appreciable difference between single and multi
crewing in terms of maintenance or morale aboard any of the
vessels studied.
The results of the survey conducted indicate most upper
echelon staff managers, in position to provide guidance and
support, have erroneous, negative perceptions about the per-
formance of multi-crewed vessels, compared to single-crewed
vessels, regarding the four areas used to measure perform-
ance (productivity, efficiency, maintenance, and morale)
.
Interviews of crewmembers from dual crewed vessels
revealed an organizational approach to multi-crewing that
has been both vague and inconsistent.
It seems clear that the success of multi-crewing has
been limited by the weaknesses identified through the
research conducted.
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V. WHAT'S THE SOLUTION?
The research effort outlined in Chapter III and des-
cribed in detail in Chapter IV has identified several areas
of concern that have surfaced as major obstacles to the
successful, permanent implementation of the concept of
multi-crewing vessels. These shortcomings include informa-
tion sharing and communications, organizational planning,
leadership, and vessel reliability and maintainability. The
field of Organization Development (OD) , which deals primari-
ly with facilitating organizational change, is rich in tech-
niques, principles and practices designed to cope with the
kinds of problems that have limited the potential utility of
multi crewing. This chapter will examine a few of these OD
fundamentals. Additionally, a brief discussion is offered
declaring high reliability and low maintenance as a must for
a vessel to be suitable for multi crewing.
A. PLANNING, ORGANIZING, LEADING AND CONTROLLING
The research has clearly established that many decision
makers have erroneous perceptions about multi-crewing ves-
sels regarding productivity, efficiency, maintenance, and
morale. Further, there exists a high correlation between
their beliefs on these measures of performance, and their
position, supportive or opposed, on the concept. Finally,
the resulting general upper echelon lack of enthusiasm for
41
the crewing configuration is both flagrant and common
knowledge.
The cause of these misunderstandings can be directly
attributed to a lack of accurate information, i.e., communi-
cations. James F. Stoner [Ref. 3:p. 8] has written a
popular text on the fundamentals of management in which he
describes the management process, as originally defined over
a century ago by the founder of the classical management
school of thought, Henri Fayol, as consisting of planning,
organizing, leading and controlling. His approach to
management is founded in pursuit of accomplishing proper
levels of these attributes to achieve organizational goals.
The similarity between Stoner 's elements of management, and
the weaknesses identified by way of the research conducted
on multi-crewing vessels is startling. The need for clear
and complete information sharing and communications is
essential to carrying out these four management functions.
Decision-makers and participants involved in the implementa-
tion of multi-crewing vessels should be aware of the
economic advantages and flexibility inherent in the
selective application of the concept.
Once armed with accurate information, consequently dis-
pelling many of the misgivings that currently exist about
multi crewing, a change in leadership attitude is a reason-
able expectation. The impact of leadership behavior on the
implementation of change is well documented. Warren Bennis
42
and Burt Nanus [Ref. 4:p. 33] point out that "Success
requires the capacity to relate a compelling image that
induces enthusiasm and commitment in others." Military
managers must not only possess a belief in the possibilities
of the concept of multi-crewing vessels, they must be
willing and able to effectively communicate and foster that
belief to, and among their subordinates. Edgar H. Schein
[Ref. 5: pp. 9, 313] has written a great deal on the culture
of organizations. He defines culture as:
a pattern of basic assumptions—invented, discovered, or
developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its
problems of external adaptation and internal integration
—
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and,
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way
to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those
problems.
Schein emphasizes that much of an organization's culture is
established by its leaders. Noel M. Tichy [Ref. 6:p. 269]
also recognizes the leader's influence on an organization's
culture. "Whether chief executives intend it or not, they
have a strong impact on the culture of the organization."
Many examples of the influence of leaders on the culture of
organizations are cited by Thomas J. Peters and Robert H.
Waterman, Jr. [Ref. 7:pp. 167-168, 13-16], not the least of
which are frequent references to the ongoing impact of the
late Walt Disney on the operations of the Disney empire.
Two of the eight basic principles Peters and Waterman cite
as being critical to organizational success, productivity
through people and simultaneous loose tight properties, both
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refer to creating and fostering an awareness of, and dedica-
tion to, the central values of the company. A more topical
example of a leader's influence on his subordinates is the
experience of Lee lacocca [Ref. 8:pp. 144-250]. In Mr.
lacocca ' s autobiography, he describes how he was able to
enlist the support of his employees, and achieve remarkable
concessions from both government and labor, by successfully
relating to them his knowledge and vision of what Chrysler
Corporation was capable of, and ought to be. The United
States Coast Guard has recognized the value and influence of
leadership aboard ship by widely disseminating copies of the
Excellence in the Surface Coast Guard . M.S. Thesis, jointly
completed by LCDR Michael J. Pierce, USCG,and LCDR Robert L.
Porter, Jr., USCG [Ref. l:pp. 5-7]. These gentlemen
established, through officer and crewmember shipboard
interviews, that the Commanding Officer sets the tone for
how aggressively and enthusiastically personnel will pursue
unit goals and objectives.
There is no doubt that efforts directed toward the suc-
cessful and extended implementation of multi crewing aboard
vessels have been hampered by the effect on subordinates of
leadership behavior that suggests a lack of support or
belief in the concept.
Inequities and lack of specific guidance repeatedly sur-
faced as the theme in response to questions during the
interviews that transpired with the Commanding Officers and
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crews of two dual-crewed vessels. An examination of the




(CG-260-6) revealed that the dual-crewed platforms of
this type vessel had received and inserted a ten page
amendment to the basic manual several years after the
concept had been implemented, the purpose of which was to
establish the basic guidelines for the dual-crewing
organization. The amendment revised general billet
assignments, and briefly outlined specific duties for
special evolutions. The original Organization Manual was,
of course, written for a conventionally crewed 82' WPB.
Beyond the fact that the amendment to the manual was
painfully slow in coming, the brevity of the revision simply
did not parallel the magnitude of the organizational change.
There is no structural difference between a single-crewed
and dual-crewed 82' WPB in a material sense, but in terms of
organization the change is profound. In the absence of
specific guidance, lines of authority and responsibility can
become vague due to the duplication of crew positions inher-
ent in the multi-crewing concept. Interviews and observa-
tions aboard the two dual-crewed vessels visited revealed
most participants were responding to the demands of, or
seeking information from, the two individuals senior to them
that filled the one billet aboard the unit. Ultimately,
that led to conflicting guidance or duplication of effort.
The Organization Manual for a multi-crewed vessel should
45
eliminate the possibility of confusion over authority and
responsibility by assigning specific areas of ownership and
accountability to the single most senior member of each
department among all the crews combined. This individual
can then answer inquiries and coordinate department work
assignments and scheduling so as to maximize the efficient
use of available resources and, more importantly, minimize
confusion, repetition, and lack of clarity. A brief
addition to an organization manual designed for use aboard a
conventionally crewed vessel simply does not cover the
myriad of issues involved in so drastic an organizational
change as the shift to multi crewing.
The historical research conducted verified that the
decision to multi-crew selected Coast Guard vessels was
reached only after careful consideration, but that the
actual implementation of the concept was less than well
planned. The need for advanced planning prior to imple-
menting a major organizational change cannot be overstated.
Mr. Tichy [Ref. 6:p. 335] offers a set of guidelines to
assist leaders in managing the transition to a desired new
organizational state. Chief among his suggested steps is a
view towards the impact of a proposed change, and the
development of a plan to manage the consequences.
Specifically, Tichy recommends a review of the current
organizational state, and an examination of the strategy
intended to implement the desired new state. Potential
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problem areas should surface by projecting the change into
the unit's leader, follower, and task accomplishment arenas.
As possible areas of conflict or confusion are identified,
organizational adjustments can be planned and made to deal
with those issues. Coping with what is different after an
organizational change is not enough. An integral part of
planning to implement the change from single to multi
crewing, is consideration given to what should remain the
same. Dual-crewmember interviewees were most vocal about
dissatisfaction with the loss of seapay and the absence of a
standard, operating shipboard dining facility. Steps should
be taken to alter regulations and enact legislation that
would eliminate such compensation and welfare inequities.
B. VESSEL RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY
Equally as important to the success of a vessel multi-
crewing effort as organization, is implementing the concept
on a platform suited for it. Multi-crewing in both the 95'
WPB Division and the SES Division failed due to these vessel
types being more maintenance intensive than the high paced
operations of a multi-crewing organization allow. The
extent of preventive and spontaneous maintenance required by
a vessel, as indicated by past performance or manufacturer
expectations, needs to be low and stable. A careful analy-
sis of historical or probable maintenance demands is




All other things being equal, single crewing is prefer-
able to multi crewing. The fact is, a single-crewed vessel
is an easier organization to manage. This is not to say
that multi crewing is unmanageable, but simply to recognize
that multi-crewed vessels present participants with unique
organizational and leadership challenges. As it happens,
for many of our U.S. Coast Guard cutters, all other things
(mission, resources) are not equal. The nature of our law
enforcement, and search and rescue missions frequently
requires a rapid and sustained response capability that is
difficult to meet in geographic areas where our presence is
limited, or the demand is high. Another unequal 'other' is
the increasing Congressional scrutiny of costs that con-
tinues to result in ever tighter budgetary constraints.
One way to deal with the growing need to become more
efficient, is to identify and apply procedures designed to
gain more utility from our resources. The implementation of
multi-crewing aboard selected Coast Guard vessels has
promise of meeting this need.
A. WHICH SHIPS TO MULTI CREW?
Many types of USCG cutters may be well suited for uti-
lizing the multi-crewing concept. Any vessel type that is
not maintenance intensive, has an established record of
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reliability, and is tasked with a primary mission which
calls for an unusually high level of underway operations, is
suitable for use in a multi-crewing organization. This is
particularly true of the 82' WPB. The research data
collected and reviewed strongly indicates that this vessel
has a known and stable maintenance and performance history,
suggesting that the platform is capable of providing signi-
ficantly more utility than its current, average rate of
employment accomplishes. The limiting factor has been crew
endurance. Dual-crewed 82' WPBs and/or multi-hulled divi-
sions (squadrons) of this vessel type should be organized
and employed in any geographic area where the magnitude of
mission demands is great enough to justify such action.
Another potential multi-crewing candidate is the 110' WPC
type patrol boat. Once enough maintenance data has been
accumulated to verify that this vessel is capable of pro-
viding resource hours beyond that which a single crew can
reasonably accomplish, the platform should be organized
employing the multi-crewing concept. The 210' medium
endurance cutter may qualify for use in a multi-crewed
organization. These vessels are the Coast Guard's off-shore
work horse for extended law enforcement patrols in the
southeastern United States. A study should be made to
determine if the vessel's reliability and maintainability is
such that multi-crewing selected ships of this vessel type
is feasible and practical. The same potential for multi
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crewing exists aboard the Coast Guard's icebreakers, buoy-
tenders, high endurance cutters, or any vessel type with
mission demands that justify the use of the concept, and a
low enough level of maintenance requirements to make it
possible.
B. THE MULTI -CREWING ORGANIZATION
The purest form of multi-crewing vessels, as opposed to
dual crewing, involves rotating three or more crews through
two or more hulls. The WPB Division and WSES Division were
examples of this approach. Any time that one of the vessels
in the squadron is moored at its homeport, two crews would
be available to perform necessary maintenance. In the case
of patrol boats, as many as four hulls using six crews could
be organized into a division. Larger vessels may need to be
in a multi-crewed organization limited to two hulls and
three crews, to keep logistics and coordination manageable.
The basic mode of operations for these organizations when
vessels are inport is to have all division members attached
to their respective departments (engineering, deck,
operations, or administration) for daily work assignments.
Division members are assigned to specific crews for underway
purposes, although vessel operations and crewmember training
could become so standardized as to make crewmember rotation
among crews possible. However, core crew stability may have
advantages in terms of consistency and predictiveness that
outweigh the increased flexibility available with total,
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inter-crew rotation. A limited but necessary, permanent,
shoreside staff, consisting of a Division Commanding
Officer, Executive Officer, and Engineering Officer, is
needed for coordination. The Division EO and XO should also
have a number of permanent, shoreside, personnel to assist
them in carrying out their duties.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The study conducted for this paper centered on manage-
ment and behavioral problems, specifically organizational,
attitudinal, and communicational , that have limited the
ability of multi-crewed vessels to demonstrate their poten-
tial prowess. A more detailed cost benefit analysis should
be carried out to verify the practical and economic feasi-
bility of utilizing the concept, and to further identify the
strengths and weaknesses associated with such an
organization.
Consideration should be given to the level and type of
logistic and administrative support that will be needed for
general and specific multi-crewed vessel organizations.
Administrative issues, such as determining the procedures
and repercussions to making the changes needed to current
policies that preclude providing the standard messing and
seapay benefits to multi-crewed vessels, should be examined.
A detailed and complete organization manual should be
developed that establishes the framework and policies around
which multi-crewed vessels should generally operate. In
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terrris of logistics, there are numerous questions to be
answered. If a vessel is to be multi crewed, the ship
itself can no longer serve as home to the non-married, or
geographically separated from family, crewmember. This
means an examination of shoreside housing alternatives, such
as bachelor quarters or leased housing, should be conducted
to determine costs and operating procedures. Smaller multi-
crewed floating units may be able to have their support
needs easily served by the independent units that currently
exist for that purpose (Groups, Support Centers, Bases, and
Assistance Teams) . Larger multi-crewed vessels may need to
have their own additional support personnel and facilities.
All of these issues should be examined and resolved
prior to establishing multi-crewed vessel organizations.
D. CONCLUSION
As is often the case in developing a paper such as this
one, a great deal more data was collected than actually
used. The survey included opportunities for respondents to
record their own ideas about how the Coast Guard might
better organize and utilize our afloat resources. Included
among the concepts most frequently suggested were the
following:
- Augment vessel crew with shore duty maintenance team,
and rotate crewmembers through the team.
- Longer deployments by single-crewed vessels because
productivity increases as daily learning takes place.
52
- Cluster like ships into flotillas/squadrons. Squadron
Commander has an administrative, supply, engineering,
and training support staff. Crewmembers report to the
Squadron Commander upon initial arrival and are
permanently assigned to the one vessel with the greatest
need.
- Acquire less costly, mission specialized vessels rather
than multi-mission vessels.
- Improved funding, training, and support to traditional
single crewing.
- Develop a cadre of seagoing specialists.
Many of these innovative and thought-provoking approaches
fueled the development and formation of this thesis. All
such data has been retained, and is available to any inter-
ested party. Perhaps even more encouraging is the
confirmation provided by these responses that the leadership
talent and determination needed to assure the successful
implementation of multi crewing aboard ship, or any other
major organizational change the future may hold for the




U.S. COAST GUARD ORGANIZATION
The United States Coast Guard is an armed service
organized in peacetime under the Department of Transporta-
tion. In time of war or at the President's order, the Coast
Guard operates under the jurisdiction of the United States
Navy. The service numbers approximately 40,000 officers and
men manning over three hundred ships and aircraft. Its
responsibilities include ocean and coastal search and
rescue, marine inspection of U.S. vessels, maritime pollu-
tion protecton, enforcement of laws and treaties, and
boating standards.
The organization of the Coast Guard is described in
Figure 3. The area offices are primarily responsible for
administrative and planning activities to carry out head-
quarters programs and policies. District offices primarily
control the operational units assigned to them. These
various units, except for major afloat commands, are


































11th District: Long Beach, CA
12th District: Alameda, CA
13th District: Seattle, WA
14th District: Honolulu, HI
17th District: Juneau, AK











Point Barrow 840 1,062
Point Chico 952 1,038
Point Heyer 1,,029 1,094
Point Hobart 1,,234 1,409
Point Ledge 770 805
Point Winslow 845 1,126
Average Annual 1, 017 hrs
82' Dual Crew^
Point Bridge 2,,579 2,470
Point Brower 2,,459 2,068
Point Camden 2,,330 2,063
Point Divide 2,,296 1,740
Point Evans 2,,268 1,829
Point Judith 2,,024 2,279
Point Stuart 2,,457 1,690
Average Annual 2, 182 hrs
95' Sinale Crew
Cape Fox 2,,893 1,747
Cape York 2,,767 2,080











































^Costs of military pay and allowances during FY 85 for
dual crewed units were unavailable at the time Table I was
developed. FY 84 military pay and allowance costs were used




FY 8 5 ANNUAL INSPECTION RESULTS FOR WPBS
Overall Material Naval Elec- Person-
all Inspec- Engi- tronic nel
Evalua- tion neer- Engi- Inspec-
tion ing neer- tion
Cutter Name ing
82' Sinale Crew
Point Barrow E G G E G
Point Chico G
Point Heyer E E G E E
Point Hobart E E G E E
Point Ledge U E G G G
Point Winslow E E E
82' Dual Crew
Point Bridge E E E
Point Browers^ E
Point Camden E E E E
Point Divide





Cape York E E NR
95' Multi Crew
Cape Current E G E NR




NR = Not Reported




PREDICTION AND CRITERIA QUESTION RESPONSES
Survey Productivity Haintanance Horale EfTiciency Seniors Opinion
Numb«r PredQ6 PredQ9 PredQIO PredQIl ProdQ17 Cnt Q13
] 1 2 2 • I 2
2 1 2 2 1 1 2
3 1 2 2 2 2 2
A 2 2 2 2 2 2
5 2 2 2 2 2 2
6 2 2 2 1 1 2
7 1 I 1 1 1
8 2 2 1 1 2
9 2 2 1 2 1
10 2 2 2 2 2
11 2 2 1 2 1
12 1 1 1 1 1
13 1 1 1 1 1
M 2 2 2 2 1 2
15 1 2 1 2 1
16 1 2 2 1 1 2
17 1 I 1 1 I
18 1 1 * • 1
19 2 2 2 1 2
20 1 1 1 1 1
21 2 2 2 2
22 2 2 1 2 2
23 1 1 1 2 1
24 2 2 1 2 1
25 1 1 2 • 1
26 2 2 2 1 2
27 2 2 1 2 2
28 2 2 1 2 2 1
2<3 2 2 2 2 2 2
30 2 2 1 2 2
31 2 2 2 2 2
32 2 1 1 1 1
33 1 1 2 1 2
34 1 1 1 • 1
35 2 2 2 2 1 1
36 2 2 2 2 2 1
37 • • 2 2 2 2
38 1 2 1 2 2 1
1 Supporter 2 Opposed • •• hki Response
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Survey Productivity Maintenance Morale ETficiency Seniors Opinion
Number Pred 06 Pred 09 Pred 010 Pred Oil Pred 017 Cnl013
39 1 1 1 • 1
40 2 1 1 2 2
41 1 1 2 1 1
42 2 1 1 • 2
43 2 1 1 2 1
44 2 1 2 1 1
45 2 2 2 1 • 2
46 1 2 2 2 1 2
47 • • 1 • • 1
48 2 2 2 1 2 2
49 2 2 2 2 2 2
50 1 1 1 1 1 1
51 2 2 2 2 2 2
52 1 1 1 1 1
53 2 2 • 1 1
54 2 1 2 1 1
55 2 2 2 1 2
56 2 1 1 2 1
57 I 2 1 1 1
58 2 2 1 1 1
59 2 2 1 • 2
60 2 2 1 2 2
61 2 2 1 2 2
62 1 1 1 1 1
63 2 2 2 2 2 2
64 1 1 1 1 1
65 2 2 2 2 1 2
66 * • 1 2 2
67 2 • 2 • 2
68 2 1 2 1 1
69 1 2 1 1 2
70 2 2 2 2 • 2
71 2 2 2 2 • 2
72 2 2 2 ^ 2
73 2 2 2 2
74 1 2 1 1 1
75 1 1 2 • 2
1 « Supporter 2 » Opposed • = No Response
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TABLE IV
STEPWISE REGRESSION Y^ : OPINION 5 X VARIABLES
Sumntiry Inforrrvation
F to Entw- A
F to R«fnov# 3.996
Num6*r of Si*p$ 2
Var\^)« EntwwJ 2
VarvdbJes Forced 0.0
No Rwidwl Statistics Computed
Note : 1 6 c^ses deleted with missing values.




. R-s<iuared : Std .Error
64 .41 39
Source
Analysis of Virvsnce Table
Df SumSqu«-es: MeanSqiwre; F-test:
REGRESSION 1 6.034 6 034 39 633
RESHXJAL 57 8.678 152
TOTAL 58 14.712






Std. Err ; Std. Value;
.427
668 .106 .64
Variables Not in Equation




PRODUCT P/ ITY 084 3%




(Last St*f) STEP no. 2 VARIABLE EHTERED : X4 : EFFICIENCY
R: R-sqfJ«-f<i: Adj. R-5<yj<rgd Std. Error
675 455 .436 378
Source
Anakjsis of Varwnc* Table
Of : Sum Sqaares : Mean Square F-te5t:
REGRtSSKDN 2 6.701 3 35 23419
REStXJAL 56 8 011 143
TOTAL 58 14712
STEP NO. 2 Steyvfs^ Refr»5si«i Yi i)PINION 5 X v«ri^t«s
Parameter Value
Variables In Equation
Std. Err.: Std. Value " to Rerrwve:
HTERCEPT 18
MORALE .626 105 .6 55.777
EFFCIENCY 217 101 217 4.66
Parameter
Variables Not in Equatxjn









PLEASE CIRCLE THE LETTER THAT DESIGNATES YOUR APPLICABLE
RESPONSE
1. What is the total amount of your USCG active duty-
service?




e. more than 25 years








What is the total amount of your USCG years at sea?




e. more than 10 years
4. Which of the following types of USCG afloat units have







f. boats less than 82' in length
g. others:
5. In what Districts have the USCG afloat units that you
have completed tours of duty aboard been homeported?
CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY
a. 1 c. 3 e. 7 g. 9 i. 12 k. 14
b. 2 d. 5 f
.
8 h. 11 J- 13 1. 17
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6. What capacities have you served in during your USCG sea





e. Deck Watch Officer
f. Engineering Watch Officer
g. crewmember
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE MEANT TO ELICIT YOUR VIEWS
REGARDING THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF MULTI-CREWING
SHIPS; e.g., rotating three crews through two ships, or four
crews through three ships:






8. Using resource hours per year as a measure of produc-
tivity, how do you compare multi crewing with single
crewing, all other things being equal? The multi-crewed
vessel will be:
a. more productive than the single-crewed vessel
b. equally as productive as the single-crewed vessel
c. less productive than the single-crewed vessel
9. All other things being equal, how do you compare multi
crewing with single crewing in terms of how well the
vessel will be maintained (cleanliness, preventive main-
tenance, appearance)? The multi-crewed vessel will be:
a. better maintained than the single-crewed vessel
b. equally as well maintained as the single-crewed
vessel
c. not as well maintained as the single-crewed vessel
10. All other things being equal, how do you compare multi
crewing with single crewing in terms of crew morale?
The multi-crewed vessel will have:
a. higher morale than the single-crewed vessel
b. morale similar to that of the single-crewed vessel
c. lower morale than the single-crewed vessel
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11. Using dollar costs per resource hour as a measure of
efficiency, how do you compare multi crewing with single
crewing, all other things being equal? The multi-crewed
vessel will be:
a. more efficient than the single-crewed vessel
b. equally as efficient as the single-crewed vessel
c. less efficient than the single-crewed vessel
12. If you were the Commandant, and had to decide how to
gain additional utility from current afloat resources at
minimal cost, how would you do it?
a. require more time underway from single-crewed
vessels
b. use augmented crews on vessels
c. use two complete crews per vessel
d. use multiple crews rotating through multiple vessels
e. a better configuration might be:
13. How do you feel about multi crewing?
a. I strongly support it
b. I support it
c. I am willing to try it
d. I oppose it
e. I strongly oppose it










16. Are there any weaknesses you listed in your response to
question number 15 that you think are insurmountable?
Which ones and why?
17. How do you think officers senior to you in the chain of
command feel about the multi-crewing of ships?
a. they strongly support it
b. they support it
c. they are willing to try it
d. they oppose it
e. they strongly oppose it
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